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 1 
Introduction 
A notable change in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War has been 
the growing prominence of the ‘new’ security issues such as anti-personnel landmines, the trade in 
conflict diamonds, or the proliferation of small arms.1 In addition, non-state actors and policy 
networks have emerged as prominent players in the creation and formulation of regional and 
international control regimes that seek to counter these new security threats. A well-known example 
is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), an umbrella organisation that brought 
together some 1200 nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) from over 60 countries, campaigning for 
and lobbying governments to agree on a total prohibition of anti-personal landmines. Another 
example is the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). It acts as a coordinator for 
some 500 non-governmental members from over 100 countries campaigning for strengthened 
governmental controls on the trade in small arms. Further noteworthy are the policy coalitions that 
have formed between governments and non-governmental networks on new security issues. Together 
with the Canadian and Austrian governments, for example, the ICBL campaigned for the convening 
of an international conference in Ottawa in 1997 to ban anti-personnel landmines. Similar, in the 
months before the 2001 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms, there 
emerged a “powerful coalition between States, international organisations and civil society ... to 
promote effective global action.”2        
 
From a theoretical perspective, such policy coalitions raise the question of whether, over the last 
decade, there has been a trend towards the governance of new security issues. Thus, one can 
justifiably ask whether there has been a shift in policy influence away from governments and towards 
the authority of non-state actors. This paper assesses this question with reference to the role of NGOs 
in the creation of the current European Union regime on conventional arms exports and small arms 
control. The formation of this regime, based on three major policy instruments adopted by the EU 
member states in 1997/98, was driven by an emerging policy coalition between ‘like-minded’ 
governments, which also closely cooperated with certain NGOs and policy research experts. In 
addition, by 1997, there had developed a transnational advocacy network among several hundred 
                                                     
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Portland, 
Oregon (Feb.03) and the British International Studies Association Conference in London, UK (Dec.02). I thank 
Dr. Bono for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  
1 The terms small arms and light weapons, hereafter referred to small arms, are employed as a generic term to 
weapons that can be carried by one to three persons. They include weapons such as assault rifles, light machine 
guns, grenade launchers, and related ammunition. The phenomenon of small arms proliferation consists of a) 
destabilising accumulations and spreads of military small arms and light weapons, b) illicit trafficking in these 
weapons, and c) the misuse of these weapons by armed forces. 
2 Greene, O., Clegg, E., Meek, S. and O’Callaghan, G. (2000) Briefing 1 – An Agenda for the UN 2001 
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (London, Biting the Bullet: 
BASIC, International Alert, Saferworld, 2000), p.2. 
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European NGOs, which lobbied governments for strengthened arms control measures.3 This paper 
will assess the importance of NGOs in the European small arms regime with a view to determine 
whether their example provides evidence for a shift of policy authority away from its traditional 
state-centric sources towards a governance of small arms control. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section introduces the concept of policy networks in 
more detail. It also looks at some of the factors underlying the emergence of new security issues and 
related networks. I then turn to the European control regime on conventional arms exports and small 
arms control, and, in particular, the governmental competition underlying the emergence of this 
control regime. Lastly, I turn to the specific role of NGOs in the creation of the European arms 
regime.4 I argue that non-state actors made significant contributions to ‘winning coalitions’ by 
assisting and facilitating the emergence of governmental co-operation on arms control. Further, it 
seems that NGOs had significant input into the formulation of the regime. Thus, it is especially the 
dynamic nature of the EU regime, providing for annual reviews of the policy instruments and reports 
on arms exports that can be attributed to non-state actor advocacy. Nevertheless, it is evident that 
governments and governmental leadership remain key to change on small arms policies, and that 
even like-minded governments have limits to their co-operation with nongovernmental actors. In 
short, while non-state actors are certainly of consequence to the European arms regime, there is little 
evidence for a shift toward a governance of small arms policies.          
 
 
The Context 
Policy networks on ‘new security’ issues  
As mentioned, in conjunction with the rise of new security issues, there emerged a number of issue-
specific policy networks in the 1990s. Policy networks here are understood as the formal and 
informal rules and interpersonal relationships between policy actors who share certain goals and 
aims, and who seek to influence the policy options adopted within their issue-area. Transnational 
policy networks refer to “coalitions of actors who regularly interact across national boundaries” and 
who include at least one actor who “is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization”.5 Common to these new security networks is their  
                                                     
3 Saferworld The Case for a European Code of Conduct on the Arms Trade Pamphlet, undated  (London, 
Saferworld), p.2. 
4 A note on the sources informing this paper: it relies largely on information provided by non-governmental 
organisations working on arms control and qualitative interviews with participants and observers of the 
transnational networks under discussion. In particular, several interviews with such participants and observers in 
London, Bradford and Brussels in December 2002 – February 2003 have provided substantial input to this 
paper. Contacted NGOs and centres include Saferworld, BASIC, Campaign against the arms trade, Dept. of 
Peace Studies / University of Bradford, IANSA and GRIP.   
5 Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) (1995a) Bringing transnational relations back in: Non-state actors, domestic 
structures and international institutions Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.3. 
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focus on principled ideas, that is, “normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from 
wrong and just from unjust”.6 Thus, they are policy coalitions based on shared sets of principled and 
causal beliefs, as well as a common policy enterprise.7 They seek to influence governmental policy 
choices through the “strategic use of norms, ideas and information”8 and by “providing ideas and 
information to [political] allies”, by “coordinating policy initiatives”, and by “appealing to 
international norms that resonate in the domestic context.”9 A well-known example of non-
governmental participants in policy networks are epistemic communities. They are networks “of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within [their] domain or issue-area.”10 They tend to be composed 
of scientific experts “to whom governments turn for knowledge in times of uncertainty”.11 Their 
activity has been noted especially in environmental issue-areas such as the international protection of 
the ozone layer, the banning of chlorofluorocarbons,12 or the international management of whaling.13 
Such epistemic communities have also been identified in the security realm. Transnational security 
networks formed, for example, in the 1950s and 60s, when European policy advocates entered into 
transnational coalitions with U.S. scientists, activists and government officials to influence the 
American position on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.14 Non-governmental policy experts have also 
participated in policy networks on Soviet and post-Soviet security policies, and have closely 
interacted with networks of their American counterparts.15 A further type of transnational networks 
of relevance here are advocacy networks, that is, networks between nongovernmental organisations, 
researchers and campaigners lobbying for shared policy aims.16 These nongovernmental networks, 
while also seeking to influence state policies, are not directly participating in policy formulation 
processes but rather seek to exert pressure through public campaigning and the mobilisation of the 
                                                     
6 Goldstein, J., Keohane, R. (eds.) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p.9. 
7 Haas, P. (1992a) ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International 
Organization 46.1 (Winter 1992):1-35, p.3. 
8 Evangelista, M. (1999) Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, p.389. 
9 Evangelista 1999:381f. 
10 Haas 1992a:3. 
11 Price, R. (1998) ‘Reversing the gun sights: transnational civil society targets land mines’ International 
Organization 52.3 (Summer 1998):613-44, p.620. 
12 Haas 1992a and Haas, P. (1992b) ‘Banning chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to 
protect stratospheric ozone’, in Haas 1992a:187-224. 
13 Peterson, M. (1992) ‘Whalers, cetologists, environmentalists, and the international management of whaling’ 
in Haas 1992a:147-186. 
14 Risse-Kappen, T. (1995b) Cooperation among Democracy: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.105ff. See also Adler, E. (1992) ‘The emergence of 
cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control’ 
International Organization 46.1 (Winter 1992):101-145. 
15 see, in particular, Evangelista 1999; the edited volume by Risse-Kappen 1995a; and Checkel, J. (1997) Ideas 
and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 
16 See, for example, Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists beyond Borders – Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
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general public. Methods employed in this regard include, for example, letter-writing and media 
campaigns to encourage government officials and ministers to adopt certain policies.  
 
The emergence of networks on new security issues  
The networks on new security issues have formed as a consequence of the following factors. 
Importantly, the end of the Cold War implied new scope on international security agendas that were 
no longer dominated by superpower confrontation and the dominant threats of major conventional 
warfare and use of weapons of mass destruction. This meant that organisations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and others with direct experience and knowledge of 
conflicts in the developing world were increasingly successful in their promotion of new policy 
issues among governments and non-governmental actors. The end of the Cold War also implied a 
refocusing of the agendas of NGOs with established arms control, disarmament and security 
programmes to take account of emerging policy issues that fell within their mandate. Such actors 
with an ‘early awareness’ of the new security threats then attempted to raise the salience of issues on 
the agendas of governments, international organisations and the broader civil society. Striking in this 
context is that such awareness raising often started through the activities of only a handful of actors 
who shared a strategic vision of how to achieve a change of governmental policies. For example, the 
initial impetus for an international movement to ban landmines was launched by some three NGOs in 
1992 when they agreed that such a movement was not only an urgent need, but also a feasible 
undertaking.17   
  
It was also important for the emergence of the new networks that the United Nations General 
Assembly and the Secretariat picked up policy issues the United Nations was experiencing through 
its presence in the developing world and, in particular, in zones of crisis and violent conflict. By 
reference to new policy concerns, the adoption of resolutions in the General Assembly and speeches 
by the Secretary General, the UN significantly contributed to the identification of relevant issues for 
the international community and for governmental co-operation. With relation to small arms, for 
example, the then Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali was among the first on the international 
political level in 1995 to call for action on the proliferation and excessive accumulation of small 
arms.18 Also, the UN Institute for Disarmament (UNIDIR), directly confronted with the effects of 
small arms in conflict and post-conflict situations, began a series of reports that highlighted the 
                                                     
17 See, for example, Cameron, M., Lawson, R. and Tomlin, B. (eds.) (1998) To Walk Without Fear: The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines Toronto: Oxford University Press. For a further exploration of transnational 
advocacy surrounding the ban on landmines see Hubert, D. (2000) The Landmine Ban: A case study in 
Humanitarian Advocacy Occasional Paper 42, Rhode Island: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International 
Studies, Brown University; Price 1998; Rutherford, K. (2000a) ‘The evolving arms control agenda: implications 
of the role of NGOs in banning antipersonnel landmines’ World Politics 53.1 (October 2000):74-114; 
Rutherford, K. (2000b) ‘A theoretical examination of disarming states: ngos and anti-personnel landmines’ 
International Politics 37 (December 2000):457-478. 
18 United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, Agenda for Peace: A Supplement (New York, 
United Nations, January 1995). 
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effects of the proliferation of these weapons. Reports by a panel and a group of governmental 
experts, commissioned by the General Assembly to analyse the problem and to suggest possible 
countermeasures, not only contributed to a clarification of the scope and nature of the problem, but 
also by making the issue acceptable on the level of governments.19     
 
Further, crucial to the rise of new security issues on policy agendas, has been the interest of certain 
governments to champion and actively promote policy changes on regional and international levels. 
Canada and Austria for example, began to take on leadership positions on the issue of AP mines and 
to rally like-minded governments around the aim of a complete ban of AP mines. With regards to 
small arms, in the mid 90s Colombia and Mexico in particular started to push for change on the level 
of the Organisations of American States, pointing towards the link between drug trafficking, 
organised crime and the illicit trafficking in firearms. In West Africa, on the initiative of Mali, which 
was facing the problem of small arms proliferation in the aftermath of its civil war, there also 
developed impetus for greater regional controls. With the subsequent support of Nigeria, states 
member to the Economic Community of Western African States eventually adopted in 1998 a 
moratorium on the import and export of small arms. Likewise, in Europe, several states began to 
include small arms control on their agendas, and to champion greater regional controls. Thus, after 
several years of agenda-setting by non-state actors and the United Nations, governments began to 
accept that the issue of small arms proliferation was an issue requiring urgent action and on which 
policy change was potentially possible.20 Moreover, the openness of certain governments towards 
aims promoted by non-state actors led to the emergence of the policy coalitions under discussion 
here.     
 
The interests in new security issues among certain governments, as well as among private funding 
bodies for NGOs, also implied the increased availability of funds for non-state actors to engage in 
research, campaigning and lobbying on such issues. Thus, private grant making institutions such as 
the Carnegie Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the Ford Foundation, 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Winston Foundation for World Peace all began to include small 
arms issues in their relevant programmes on international peace, security and social justice. This then 
also meant that there was an increasing number of NGOs which started to focus on new security 
threats and to join the efforts of those actors who were already promoting policy changes. 
Particularly interesting in this context is the funding of non-state actors working on small arms 
control by governments sympathetic to their aims. It is unclear at present how large the proportion of 
such governmental funding is in relation to non-governmental sources such as private foundations or 
                                                     
19 See http://disarmament.un.org/cab/, the website of the Conventional Arms Branch of the UN Department for 
Disarmament Affairs, for relevant links.  
20 For an elaboration on the role of certain governments in the creation of regional and international control 
initiatives, see Greene, O. (2000) ‘Examining international responses to illicit arms trafficking’, Crime, Law & 
Social Change 33 (2000):151-190. 
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membership contributions. Further, several organisations refuse governmental funds on principle. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly justified to say that governments fund much of the current activity among 
NGOs on small arms control. This at least is borne out by, for example, the present funding structure 
of IANSA. While IANSA seeks to finance the majority of its activities through private grants of, for 
example, the above named American Foundations and Funds, it is, as of early 2003, receiving most 
of its funds from the UK government.21 Governments have also financed or part-financed many of 
the seminars and workshops on small arms that bring together government officials, policy experts 
and NGOs, and they are major contributors to such joint research ventures as the Bite the Bullet 
project. This project emerged as a collaborative effort of several UK based research centres and 
policy experts on the fringes of the preparatory committee meetings for the 2001 UN Conference on 
the Illicit Small Arms Trade. Its aim is to contribute to an informed policy debate between 
governments by identifying priorities for action and suggesting policy options. Notably, the UK 
Department for International Development, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland have financed much of this activity.22 Similarly, the 
Small Arms Survey, a collaborative effort between research centres, policy experts and NGOs from 
around the world, is engaged in the research of the small arms trade with a view to provide an annual 
overview of aspects of the trade in these weapons, as well as to identify policy options. While 
representing an independent project based at the University of Geneva, it is financed largely by the 
governments of Switzerland, Belgium, the UK, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Sweden.23   
 
In sum, underlying the emergence of policy networks on new security issues have been an increased 
scope for action on international agendas provided by the end of the Cold War, the efforts for raising 
awareness by small numbers of organisations and the inclusion of relevant issues on the agendas of 
the United Nations and, importantly, of certain governments. There then also emerged patterns of co-
operation between non-state actors and certain governments championing causes that were strongly 
supported by these non-state actors. With this general rise in attention being paid to new security 
issues, there was also the growing availability of funds for NGOs. It is against this background that 
by now a multitude of NGOs have joined the policy networks that have crystallised around ‘new’ 
security issues. A relevant question is, of course, whether such policy networks matter, and, in 
particular, whether non-state actors can play significant roles in such policy networks. It is with 
reference to the European small arms regime and the role of NGOs in its creation that I will approach 
these questions in the following.   
 
 
                                                     
21 Personal communication, telephone, 20th February 2003.   
22 For further information on the Biting the Bullet project, visit www.international-alert.org. 
23 Small Arms Survey (2002) Annuaire sur les armes légères 2002, Geneva: vi. 
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The European Small Arms Regime 
Over the last years, states member to the European Union have been amongst the most active in 
international efforts to address the proliferation of small arms. On a regional level, they also have 
created a control regime on small arms that seeks to combat the illicit trafficking in conventional 
arms, to promote restraint and responsibility in arms export policies, as well as providing assistance 
to third countries affected by destabilising small arms accumulations. In the following, I elaborate on 
this control regime and point towards the particular dynamics within this regime. I then turn to the 
intergovernmental policy competition that shaped the creation of European small arms regime. I 
argue that it was a coalition of like-minded governments that was crucial to the creation of this 
regime and its dynamic nature.       
 
Major EU policy instruments on small arms 
The current EU regime on small arms is based on three major policy instruments, two of which 
address small arms within the broader context on controls on the trade in conventional weapons. The 
first of these is the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking. Adopted by the 
EU Council in June 1997, the Programme recognises accumulations and illicit trafficking of 
conventional arms and, in particular, of small arms and light weapons, as a threat to international 
security as well as to the internal stability and human rights situation in affected countries. It seeks to 
foster the collective efforts made to address illicit trafficking through means such as enhanced cross-
border co-operation among law enforcement agencies, and capacity building for such agencies in 
countries requesting assistance. Second, in June 1998, the EU Council adopted the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports. The Code seeks to foster co-operation among EU member states by 
establishing common criteria against which member states will, on a case-by-case basis, consider the 
granting or denial of arms export licenses. These criteria aim at preventing exports that could 
contribute to regional instability or that may be used in internal repression or international 
aggression. They also include concern for the international obligations of arms exporting states 
under, for example, United Nations arms embargoes, as well as for the risk of illicit diversion of arms 
transfers or re-exportation of arms to undesirable end-users. The Code therefore offers a common 
framework for the establishment of high common standards for responsible arms transfers. 
Significantly, the Code also includes operative provisions for denial notification and consultation 
mechanisms among member states. Thus, states will inform all other participating states of the 
denials for specific arms export licenses. States agree to not use such information for their own 
commercial advantage, but, should they wish to grant an essentially identical transaction, they will 
consult the state, which previously denied the transfer license. In addition, the EU Code contains 
provisions for member states to draw up confidential annual reports on their arms exports. These are 
used as the basis for a consolidated report on arms exports that is submitted to the EU Council for its 
annual review of the Code operations. This review meeting also identifies areas in the Code requiring 
further improvements. The third major policy instrument of the EU regime is the Joint Action on 
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Small Arms. It was adopted by the EU Council in December 1998, and it is concerned with the 
adverse affects of small arms accumulations and spreads on security, post-conflict rehabilitation and 
sustainable development. It promotes responsible arms export policies and national weapons 
management practices. It also promotes technical and financial support to countries requesting 
assistance. Assistance in such situations can support the management of surplus weapons and 
voluntary weapons collection programmes targeting illegally held small arms.  
 
These policy documents are notable in particular for their dynamic elements of annual reviews and 
continued consultations and information exchange among EU members. Thus, there is now a process, 
which puts conventional and small arms control issues regularly on the agenda of relevant EU organs 
and national governments, and which facilitates further co-operation on national arms export and 
other control policies. Indeed, it is fair to argue that this regime has, by now, developed its own 
momentum towards greater co-operation. As argued by the European Parliament, “the Code of 
Conduct has its own built-in dynamics. The application of the Code is leading member states towards 
greater dialogue, mutual understanding and convergence. It is clear that the initial mistrust of some 
member states is giving way to greater confidence.”24 In addition, there is also a move toward greater 
transparency on European arms exports. For example, since 1999, the EU Council publishes the 
annual consolidated report on arms export under the Code of Conduct. By now, most member states 
also publish the annual national reports that form the basis for the consolidated report. These states 
are Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France, Germany, Ireland and Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. As will become evident in the subsequent discussion, the 
emergence of such a regime based on a dynamic process among EU states was not predetermined or 
inevitable. Rather, the nature of the current regime is the outcome of intense political competition 
between various actors seeking to shape multilateral control efforts.   
 
The co-ordination of arms control policies  
The origins of the present regime on conventional weapons can be traced back to 1969/70 and the 
creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC). This intergovernmental mechanism provided 
for regular meetings of the foreign ministries of European Community (EC) members, and therefore 
offered a forum in which to co-ordinate national policies on selected issues so as to enhance the 
collective voice of Western European interests. At times, such co-ordination also extended to 
security policies and arms export controls as evidenced by the EC arms embargoes on, for example, 
Libya and Syria in 1985, and South Africa in 1986. However, the EPC remained largely limited in its 
use by member states, which kept exclusive national control over their arms trade. Thus, while co-
ordinating their policies on certain issues, governments pursued many other foreign and security 
                                                     
24 European Parliament (2002) Report on the Council’s Third Annual Report according to Operative Provision 
8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers A5-0286/2002 (Brussels, European Parliament, 
10 September 2002), p.9. 
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issues independently of each other. A change in this European approach occurred, in particular, with 
the Gulf War in 1990/1. Thus, several European arms exporting countries realised to have 
inadvertently contributed to regional instability in the Gulf. The conflict also demonstrated the 
shortcomings of a common control system relying on exclusively national policies. For instance, “the 
denial of exports to Iraq by some Community members, for reasons of international security, had 
little practical effect given the export practices of other Community members.”25 In 1991, responding 
to this shortcoming, the Political Committee of the EPC convened an ad-hoc working group of mid-
ranking officials from Community members to investigate the possibilities for enhancing the 
common approach to arms exports. In response, this intergovernmental working group on 
conventional arms exports, known under its French acronym COARM, negotiated a list of common 
arms export criteria to serve as the standard against which member states would consider the granting 
or denial of export licenses. These criteria were adopted by the EU Councils of Luxembourg and 
Lisbon in 1991/92, and served as the basis for strengthened co-operation on conventional arms 
control. Further, in 1994, the mandate of COARM was revised, and subsequently not only included 
the comparison of national regulations and procedures, but was also extended to exploring possible 
steps toward a harmonisation of national arms export policies.26 Thus, there were clearly steps 
toward a change from the mere co-ordination to a greater convergence of arms control policies.   
 
At the same time it was evident that debates on any further development toward greater co-operation 
lacked consensus among European governments on the desirability of greater multilateral controls. 
On one side of the debate, there were states such as Germany and the Netherlands, which argued for 
common arms export policies at a high level of controls. Likewise, Ireland argued for the creation of 
a Code of Conduct on arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations. These states pointed 
out that the common criteria, and, in particular, the lack of common interpretations left the European 
arms regime with significant weaknesses. This led to a situation similar to the one encountered 
before the adoption of the Luxembourg / Lisbon criteria. For example, while Portugal and Italy were 
observing a self-imposed arms embargo on Indonesia, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands had 
continued their exports. Likewise, some member states exported to sub-Saharan Africa, while others 
denied licenses on the grounds of undesirable effects of arms exports to the region.27 It was against 
this background that certain governments started to identify common interests in their security aims, 
and to consequently coalesce around the aim of strengthening multilateral measures. Importantly, 
these states included Germany, which had weight not only for its general political and economic  
                                                     
25 Saferworld (1991) Regulating Arms Exports: A Programme for the European Community Report (London, 
Saferworld, 1991), p.12. 
26 EU Council decision of 29 December 1994. In Davis, I. (1999) The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use 
Exports by EU Member States: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Sweden and the UK, Ph.D. thesis 
(Bradford, University of Bradford, 1999), p.156.   
27 BASIC, Saferworld and World Development Movement A European Code of Conduct on the Arms Trade 
Pamphlet, undated (London, BASIC, Saferworld, WDM), p.1. 
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clout, but also because it is a major European arms exporter. Germany’s voice therefore had a 
credibility when speaking in favour of stronger arms controls that could not be matched by other 
‘pro-control’ states such as Ireland, which has no significant defence industry. Further states in this 
coalition, however, included the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, all of which have a small to 
medium-sized defence industry. These states began to support each other’s arms control positions in 
intergovernmental negotiations in the European Council as well as in the Council working groups. 
There consequently formed a policy coalition that included small and medium states, as well as one 
of the ‘big’ European players. It was by finding and using a collective voice that this policy coalition 
sought to influence negotiations on the EC/EU level.   
  
One the other side of the political debate were the other two ‘big’ European players and arms 
exporters, that is, France and the UK. Thus, given their overseas interests, these states preferred a 
multilateral system that provided for minimal co-ordination on conventional arms trade while leaving 
room for national interests and flexibility.28 These differences in national attitudes on arms exports 
are nicely summarised in the following quote from a research report from 1992: 
  
On the EC level, concepts vary largely and make it difficult to agree on a single policy. At one 
extreme, France expounds a defence philosophy based on national autonomy and independent 
nuclear capability. This implies self-sufficiency in weapons production and foreign sales to sustain 
an industry of the required size. The UK has always seen positive political utility in arms transfers 
as a means of enhancing the security of non-EC allies of overseas possessions. Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have distanced themselves from using arms exports as an 
instrument of foreign policy, and / or taken public positions in favour of restraint. At the far end of 
the scale come Ireland and Luxembourg, with no evident interest in production or export.29  
 
Importantly, France and the UK could effectively block major developments with regards to 
multilateral controls. Thus, given the consensus-based nature of decision-making on security policies 
in the EC/EU, states have an effective veto on significant multilateral change that does not reflect 
their interests. This gave the UK and France sufficient leverage to ensure that any common 
framework for the co-ordination of European arms controls would accept the primacy of national 
interests over multilateral regulations. An example of this protection of national flexibility was given 
during the consultations on the revision of the COARM mandate in 1994. There, France could limit 
the importance of changes by having a reference included, which declared that “no mention in the 
mandate should be construed as curtailing national decision-making capability”.30 It was clear 
                                                     
28 Saferworld 1991: III; and Saferworld (1992) Arms and Dual-Use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for 
Regulation and Control Report (London, Saferworld, 1992), p.5f.  
29 Saferworld 1992:5.   
30 Adam, B. (ed.) (1995) Union européenne et exportations d’armes (Brussel, GRIP, 1995),  p.87.  
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therefore that, by the mid 1990s, like-minded governments were at an impasse in their efforts to 
significantly alter the existing multilateral arms export system.  
 
The convergence of arms control policies 
Two developments in particular worked in favour of the governmental policy coalition aiming for 
greater multilateral arms controls. The first of these concerns the growing salience of the new 
security issues. As mentioned, since the early to mid 1990s, there was a growing international 
awareness of the serious problems that are caused by illicit arms trafficking and small arms 
proliferation. By 1997 there had consequently developed a certain international momentum toward 
efforts addressing the issue of small arms proliferation, as well as on the need to counter such 
proliferation. This momentum also had ramifications in Europe by implicitly supporting the 
arguments of those governments which were seeking to further common arms control measures on 
the level of the European Union. Thus, the Dutch government, during its presidency of the EU in 
early 1997, tabled a proposal for a joint programme to address the issue of small arms and light 
weapons proliferation. Again, there was considerable political opposition. In particular, such 
opposition stemmed from the fact that addressing small arms proliferation requires greater restraint 
and controls of the legal trade in these weapons. As one observer argues, several states were 
consequently “reluctant to agree to a programme which explicitly focused on restraining legal as well 
as illicit arms accumulations and transfers”.31 As a compromise the Dutch government decided to 
focus on a programme with a focus on preventing illicit arms flows. While having a restricted focus, 
the proposed programme would, however, initiate a process of regular practical co-operation of law 
enforcement agencies, governments and EU bodies. Moreover, it would regularly bring up the issue 
of conventional arms control on the agenda of, for example, the EU Council of Ministers, and 
therefore further political momentum toward greater co-operative efforts to combat arms trafficking. 
Thus, by linking international and regional developments in arms control, the Dutch government 
successfully negotiated a programme that would establish a process promoting coordination and 
convergence of national arms export policies. The Programme was therefore also a step by the inter-
governmental coalition toward a strengthened multilateral control regime. 
 
The second development of importance occurred several months later with a major policy shift in one 
of the European key players on arms control. To elaborate, the British general elections in May 1997 
brought to power the opposition Labour Party. This led, in July 1997, to the formulation by the new 
government of an ‘ethical foreign policy’ as the basis for the foreign affairs of the UK. It included a 
commitment to promoting greater convergence of European arms policies through the promotion of a 
European code of conduct to govern legal arms exports.32 This was therefore an important shift from 
                                                     
31 Greene 2000:171. 
32 See the ‘eight point plan’, Labour Party, Labour’s Policy Pledges for a Responsible Arms Trade, 13 February 
1997 (quoted in Davis 1999:169). 
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the position of the previous Conservative government and its opposition to a strengthening of 
multilateral co-operation on arms policies. This shift also meant a decisive change in the 
constellation of national interests on the European level. Thus, France was becoming isolated among 
the ‘big’ three in its opposition to tighter controls, and there was no longer the previously existing 
consensus between France and the UK to keep legal arms transfers largely off the EU agenda. It was 
against this background that the UK took over the EU presidency in January 1998. This presented a 
valuable opportunity for the UK government to take on a leadership role on multilateral arms control 
by promoting a common code on transfers. Moreover, the chances for the success of a policy 
initiative seemed favourable. Thus, the UK government could be certain to have the support of the 
coalition of like-minded governments, which, for years already, had called for a common instrument 
to strengthen the Luxembourg and Lisbon criteria. Strategically, the UK presidency approached 
France at an early stage so as to ensure at least the tacit consent of the state, which could be expected 
to be most important source of opposition. This led to the tabling of a joint Anglo-French draft of a 
Code of Conduct, which was then negotiated during COARM meetings in the followings months.33 
During these negotiations, differences of attitudes and political competition were clearly evident. 
Such differences existed, in particular, between states such as Sweden, Belgium, Ireland and the 
Netherlands on the one hand, and France on the other. Views differed on, for example, the 
formulation of the human rights criteria that would be part of the code. While the former 
governments favoured general restraint in exports to serious human rights violators, France argued 
for a formulation that left greater room for national interpretation. France also opposed a publicly 
accessible EU consolidated report on arms exports, and therefore greater public transparency.34 In 
the end, consensus could only be reached through several agreements in which the French position 
prevailed. As explained by a Dutch official: “[a]s consensus was required from all 15 member states, 
France was in a very strong position. It was felt that it was important to get a code agreed even if it 
meant watering it down.”35 The Code was consequently adopted in June 1998. As mentioned, the 
code includes important dynamic mechanisms that have bolstered momentum among European 
Union member states toward co-operation and harmonisation of arms control policies. It also opened 
the way for the negotiation and adoption of the Joint Action on Small Arms under the German EU 
presidency in 1998. Therewith, European governments had established, in some 18 months, a 
framework for multilateral arms policies that, while still containing serious shortcomings,36 is, at 
present, undoubtedly the most sophisticated regional approach to conventional and small arms 
control.     
  
                                                     
33 Davis 1999:170. 
34 O’Callaghan, G. (1998) ‘EU pays high price for French support on Code of Conduct’, BASIC REPORTS 
(London, BASIC, June 1998). 
35 Ibid. 
36 See, for example, the report by the European Parliament (quoted above) as well as the current reports by 
Saferworld and the UK Working Group on Arms (www.saferworld.co.uk). 
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To sum up, the above account highlights the process by which the current arms regime was 
developed and the way in which it was driven by a coalition of like-minded states, assisted by 
international developments and domestic changes. Thus, certain governments started coalescing 
around shared aims so as to enhance their collective bargaining power. In particular, it was the shift 
in the policy preferences in Britain, which allowed for the establishment of co-operative measures on 
the legal exports of conventional weapons, and for an annual review and reporting mechanisms that 
promote the convergence of arms control policies. In short then, this history of European arms 
policies demonstrates how the current regime was the outcome of negotiations and bargains between 
first, competing inter-governmental coalitions, and later, between one of the European key players 
and the majority of other EU member states. What, then, has been the role of non-state actors in the 
process that led to the emergence of this regime? It is this question that I turn to in the following 
section. 
 
 
The Transnational Policy Network on European Arms Control   
As mentioned in the introduction, if there emerged an intergovernmental policy coalition on 
conventional, and in particular, small arms control, there certainly also formed policy networks 
between government officials and non-governmental policy experts and NGOs, as well as between a 
growing number of NGOs themselves. In the following, I will concentrate on the strategy and 
experiences of the London-based organisation, Saferworld, an independent foreign affairs think tank 
that was at the centre of the transnational advocacy campaign on the European Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports, and which was closely connected to government officials who shared the aim of 
strengthened multilateral arms controls. I hold that together with its nongovernmental partners, 
Saferworld could greatly facilitate the emergence of governmental policy coalitions and assist these 
in their formulation of shared interests on the multilateral level. I further argue that such non-state 
actors in particular have been at the origin of the dynamics that underpin the current EU regime on 
small arms.  
 
The transnational campaign on a European code of conduct  
If the 1990/91 Gulf War sparked inter-governmental interest in enhancing existing multilateral arms 
control, it also offered an opportunity to non-governmental actors to advocate strengthened European 
control mechanisms. Together with several policy experts Saferworld, for example, published in 
1991 and 1992 two substantial reports on the then existing national and multilateral arms control 
regulations and policies.37 These reports assessed national and multilateral control mechanisms, and 
identified weaknesses and challenges facing action on the level of the European Community. They 
thereby provided a baseline for further activity and marked the beginning of 6 years of sustained 
                                                     
37 See Saferworld 1991/1992. 
 14 
advocacy. The aim of this advocacy was to establish an inter-governmental process that would lead 
to common interpretations of the Luxembourg and Lisbon criteria. Further, the lack of transparency 
on governmental export policies was identified as a major obstacle to achieving greater governmental 
restraint and responsibility in the arms trade. With the aim of initiating policy changes, Saferworld 
and its partners decided on a two-fold strategy.38 On the governmental level, it would identify 
sympathetic and potentially sympathetic governments and seek to foster consensus among them so as 
to enhance their position on joint policy objectives. Given limited resources, it was evident that 
certain states would have to be prioritised. These countries included Germany, Ireland, Denmark and 
Holland. It also included the UK, which was included so as to “minimise opposition in at least one of 
the unsympathetic (and influential) governments.”39 Advocacy objectives for the German presidency 
of the EU in 1994 included, for example: 
• the generation of “an influential political constituency in favour of controls in 
Germany to encourage the government to play a leadership role” on arms control 
initiatives in the EU Council;  
• the mobilisation of the Irish, Danish and Dutch governments as  ““catalysers” to 
support/encourage the German government” in arms control initiatives; and  
• the “building [of] a nucleus of cross-party support amongst the opinion-shaping 
community in the UK to minimise likely UK government opposition to a German 
initiative.”40 
 
By building consensus among themselves, these governments would then be on stronger grounds 
from which to rally other governments around their cause. In order to facilitate such consensus-
building Saferworld organised several meetings with the COARM representatives of sympathetic 
governments to provide a forum for informal discussions. Such contact also allowed non-state actors 
to learn about governmental thinking on certain issues. Such access certainly remained limited. Thus, 
government officials will avoid divulging confidential information to non-state actors if this would 
be seen by their peers in other capitals as a means to strengthen their own position in 
intergovernmental negotiations.41 Nevertheless, the contact between non-state actors and government 
officials allowed NGOs to gain a better picture of governmental thinking and positions on arms 
export controls. The ‘insider’ access further allowed non-governmental experts and NGOs to voice 
the interests of their own constituencies. Government officials could also benefit through, for 
example, the contact with nongovernmental policy experts who could provide technical knowledge 
and in-depth understanding of aspects of the policy issue under discussion.42 Their informed 
                                                     
38 Saferworld 1993 Update on Saferworld’s Arms Trade Strategy Internal document, unpublished (London: 
Saferworld, October 1993). 
39 Saferworld 1993:2. 
40 Ibid:3. 
41 Personal communication, telephone, German COARM representative, February 2003. 
42 Personal interviews, Bradford and London: December 2002. 
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opinions on the likely reception of policy initiatives among other governments further allowed 
governments to better judge the chances of success of a particular policy initiative. In addition, the 
co-operation with non-governmental actors allowed sympathetic governments to enlist transnational 
support for its own position on the multilateral level. This was evidenced in 1996, when the Dutch 
government, in preparation for its upcoming EU presidency, informally launched the idea of an EU 
programme to address light weapons trafficking. Being well connected with arms control and peace 
groups, the Dutch government could thereby affirm that it would have domestic and transnational 
support for its proposal.43 This strengthened the position of the government in its claim that its 
proposal enjoyed broad public support throughout Europe. 
 
If one aspect of the advocacy campaign on strengthened European arms control was the facilitation 
and support of governmental policy coalitions, the other was the generation of constituencies among 
parliamentarians, influential opinion formers and the greater public on the level of the EC/EU. The 
formation of political constituencies was seen as essential to sustained pressure and lobbying of 
governments, and therefore to momentum toward greater arms control. To this end, Saferworld and 
other UK NGOs began to liase with, for example, high level officials in the then opposition Labour 
party in the British Parliament, seeking to convince them of the need for policy change on the EU 
level so as to counter the costs of lack of strict regulations on legal arms transfers. The generation of 
viable constituencies that would take up the aim of strengthened arms control and pressure their 
governments could be greatly advanced by establishing national processes that would regularly bring 
up the issue in parliamentary and public debates. To this end, Saferworld lobbied “national 
parliaments of target EC Member States to institute an annual debate on arms export policy”.44   
 
An important element within this strategy to generate nongovernmental support was the creation of a 
broad network of NGOs to join the call for greater national and multilateral arms export regulations. 
The concrete element around which such a nongovernmental network formed was the goal of a code 
of conduct that would achieve the aims of greater governmental restraint and responsibility, as well 
as of more transparency on governmental export policies. Thus, Saferworld, together with other non-
governmental organisations and two international lawyers had drawn up a model for such a code, 
which was formally launched in May 1995.45 A significant element in this model for a code was the 
requirement of an annual consolidated report on arms exports. As explained by a participant in the 
policy network under discussion, the strategy behind the report was as follows: one of the main 
weaknesses in European arms control was the lack of transparency. The envisioned reporting 
mechanism under the code would drive an important wedge into the secrecy surrounding the arms 
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trade. Thus, once adopted, transnational advocacy could first be directed at making the annual 
consolidated report publicly available. Moreover, as states would be committed to drawing up annual 
national reports, transnational and domestic advocacy could then be directed toward the publication 
of these national reports. This then would allow domestic political constituencies to measure the 
export record of their governments against their commitment under the code.46 In other words, the 
consolidated report would establish an important dynamic element toward greater transparency.  
 
Notably, within two years of the launch of the model code, the policy coalition among NGOs had 
grown to over 600 European non-governmental organisations working on arms control, development, 
and human rights, or which were from religious or peace group backgrounds.47 This growth was 
greatly facilitated by the circumstance that the adverse consequences of arms proliferation mobilised 
organisations and constituencies, which had no previous history in arms control issues. Thus, many 
organisations could readily accept and integrate the advocacy project proposed by a small number of 
NGOs and research centres focusing on arms control. The broad thematic and geographic spread of 
network members further meant a considerable increase in specialised knowledge about specific 
aspects of the arms trade, of the various national regulations and practices on arms control policies, 
as well as the political environment in which these policies are formulated.48 Another strength of 
such a network for NGOs was the development of complementary research and advocacy strategies. 
Thus, NGOs coordinated their work and, insofar as the research of policy issues was concerned for 
example, focused on specific aspects that were not already worked on at other research centres. Co-
operation between arms control research centres and large organisations such as OXFAM, Amnesty 
International or Save the Children was further of great benefit. Thus, these organisations have 
national offices throughout Europe, and can therefore mobilise constituencies to which the London-
based think tanks, for example, have no direct access. By joining resources, these groups could 
significantly enhance the spread and potential impact of their advocacy. Thus, the network was in the 
position to mobilise concerted public and parliamentary pressure on various European governments 
to support a European code on arms transfers that was based on high common standards. This 
advocacy work included the lobbying of government officials, the organisation of letter-writing 
campaigns to politicians so as to demonstrate the importance attached to a specific policy by their 
electorate, the collection of signatures among the public, and the launching of media campaigns.  
 
At the same time, however, there were also NGOs and activist groups that considered the proposed 
code on arms experts as fundamentally flawed and as falling considerably short of what was required 
of governments. In particular, it was groups arguing for a ban of the conventional arms trade, which 
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voiced their criticism. It was argued that the envisioned code was insufficient as it failed to make 
arms supplies “to countries outside Europe … nothing but a rare exception”.49 Consequently, it was 
in countries with strong pacifist traditions such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, where 
criticism by other non-governmental groups was the most pronounced. Such criticism weakened 
transnational advocacy on the code as it created the image of a much divided civil society.50 
Nevertheless, such criticism remained limited and arms ban NGOs abstained from actively 
boycotting the campaign for a code of conduct.  
 
It was against this background that, in 1996/97, there developed considerable transnational 
momentum in support of the proposed code. Importantly, such momentum was also developing in the 
British parliament, where Saferworld and its partners had sought to build up political backing for 
tighter arms control. Crucially, Labour showed sympathy toward the aim of a code and, as early as 
February 1997, then shadow foreign secretary Cook made a public electoral pledge to pursue such a 
code. This then meant that, when coming to power in the UK and taking over the EU presidency, the 
new government could engage in a policy initiative it could be certain to be supported by large 
sections of its own electorate, as well as by several other governments and publics across Europe. It 
also meant that there was now a clear window of opportunity for like-minded governments and non-
state actors to generate political and public support to reach a governmental consensus on a European 
code on arms transfers. The policy coalition between governments and NGOs did not, of course, 
imply the absence of considerable differences on certain policy issues between such actors. Thus, 
only a few governments shared the aim of NGOs to establish a code of conduct that would impose 
legal obligations on governments to fulfil the criteria of the code. Nor was there much governmental 
support for the creation of multilateral, as opposed to the eventually adopted bilateral, consultation 
mechanisms under a code. Even the positions between Saferworld and its partners on the one hand, 
and of the British government position on the other, diverged considerably on occasions. For 
example, Saferworld lobbied vigorously in the public for a strong document on high common 
standards and sought to put the British government under pressure by campaigning against the 
watering down in intergovernmental negotiations of the export criteria as found in the model code of 
conduct. Indeed, such advocacy led to the complaint of the British Foreign Affairs and 
Commonwealth Office that Saferworld was undermining the government’s position both at home and 
on the EU level.51 Despite such differences though, the policy coalition among like-minded 
governments and NGOs succeeded in the campaign for a Code of Conduct, and therewith in the 
establishment of a control regime that includes the mentioned dynamic aspect of annual national 
reports and reviews of its implementation.  
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Analysis  
Given the above account of transnational advocacy on strengthened arms control, what then has been 
the particular contribution of non-state actors to the creation of the European regime on conventional 
weapons in general, and small arms in particular? Certainly transnational advocacy in Europe had 
important roles to play in the processes of issue identification and awareness raising concerning 
small arms proliferation and the broader field of lack of controls on the conventional weapons trade. 
Thus, one success of non-state actors was the inclusion of small arms on the agendas of governments 
and multilateral organisations. Apart from this often acknowledged role of NGOs in agenda setting 
though, transnational advocacy in Europe made a significant contribution to the emergence and work 
of intergovernmental policy coalitions. First, with respect to the campaign on a European code of 
conduct, nongovernmental organisations have been critical in preparing the ground for the initiative 
of the new Labour government during its presidency of the EU in 1998. Finding sympathetic allies 
among front bench opposition members, the liasing of NGOs and Labour officials allowed for the 
establishment of a developed policy project on a code if Labour were to win the British elections. As 
one involved nongovernmental participant in this British policy network explains: the work that had 
already been done in formulating a policy project “meant that when (Labour) came to power, they 
were in a position to move quickly with a clear agenda. If the plan hadn’t existed, I don’t think 
Labour would have tabled the Code during their presidency” of the EU.52 Thus, non-state actors can 
surely be seen as having significantly contributed to the creation of the Code of Conduct. Second, 
non-state actors contributed to the formation of governmental coalitions. Of particular importance 
here are the mentioned workshops and seminars organised by NGOs for government officials of 
potentially sympathetic states. Such meetings with COARM officials could extend over several days 
and allowed for the first time for debates and joint problem solving exercises outside the formal 
structures of negotiations in the official meetings. Further, the absence of officials from governments 
that were opposed to greater multilateral efforts meant that joint interests and positions could be 
developed more freely. Thus, in the view of one participating nongovernmental expert, the 
importance of these informal meetings was that “it allowed for ‘open’ thinking - rather than trotting 
out government positions.”53 
 
In addition, I hold that, in such a c-cooperative environment, one of the biggest contributions of 
NGOs to the creation of the European arms regime was to convince government officials of the 
feasibility and viability of policy initiatives on certain issues. To elaborate, it would seem fair to say 
that bureaucrats are often more conservative in their estimates on what is possible on the political 
level than non-state actors. This clearly limits the willingness of officials to support ideas and policy 
projects they consider as highly unlikely to be accepted by other member states. For example, NGOs  
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faced considerable scepticism in many capitals when the model code of conduct was first launched 
by NGOs. It was a further success of non-state actors to convince sympathetic officials of the 
feasibility of promoting the adoption of a code. On a broader level, non-state actors succeeded, in 
particular, in convincing officials that measures on conventional and small arms control needed to be 
based on a dynamic process, that is, a process that allowed for the continuing co-operation of 
governments on relevant issues and for debates in parliaments and the general public. This strategic 
vision of non-state actors has found its expression in the current arms regime through the annual 
reviews of the implementation of the EU policy instruments on arms control. These dynamic 
foundations are important as they provide for mechanisms for governments to continue working 
towards common interpretations and applications of policies, as well as to identify further issues that 
should be put on the agenda of relevant governmental working groups. The strategic vision of NGOs 
with regards to creating greater transparency is also reflected in the annual reports on arms exports 
under the Code of Conduct. Some governmental allies for the inclusion of such a requirement were 
evident. Sweden, for example, has published national reports on arms exports since the 1980s. Other 
governments such as that of France were, however, strongly opposed to such reports, or at least to 
their publication outside diplomatic channels. By convincing sympathetic governments that, at a 
minimum, a confidential consolidated EU report should be included in the Code of Conduct, NGOs 
had made an important first step in achieving greater transparency. Moreover, the strategy of 
requiring national annual reports to be drawn up under the Code has eventually paid off as, 
mentioned previously, the majority of EU governments publish reports on their arms exports by 
now.54 This then also allowed for the envisioned regular national debates on governmental arms 
export and arms control policies. Indeed, even those NGOs, which are critical of the Code of 
Conduct for failing to ban most weapons exports, seem to welcome the publication of national 
reports. Thus, albeit seriously limited by continuing secrecy, the annual reports allow for better 
monitoring of governmental export policies than was possible before.  
 
In short, I hold that non-state actors were clearly of consequence in the creation of the European arms 
regime. Thus, by identifying issues, raising awareness and mobilising support among governments 
and civil societies, non-state actors made important contributions to the setting of national and 
multilateral agendas. Significantly, non-state actors greatly facilitated the building of governmental 
policy coalitions and, in the process, could convince governmental officials of the importance and 
viability of certain policy aspects. In my view then, it was the particular contribution of NGOs to the 
European arms regime that this regime is based on dynamic mechanisms that allow for continuing 
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governmental negotiations on greater convergence of their arms policies and for greater public 
transparency.    
  
Conclusion 
This paper began by pointing towards the emergence in the 1990s of policy networks that formed 
around new security threats. It asked whether the increasing prominence of non-state actors in such 
policy coalitions provides evidence for a trend toward the governance of arms control in Europe, that 
is, whether there has been a shift in authority in the policy process away from governments and 
toward non-state actors. As the last section of the paper argued, there are certainly grounds for 
arguing that non-state actors have been of consequence in the creation of the European small arms 
regime, and, in particular, in the adoption of an EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. 
Specifically, non-state actors could facilitate the emergence of, and contribute to, governmental 
policy coalitions, and, within this context, insist on the inclusion of certain dynamic elements in the 
European regime. Non-state actors thus played a significant role in ‘winning coalitions’ that 
promoted strengthened arms control among EU governments and publics. However, in itself, such 
participation in winning coalitions does not substantiate the claim that there is a trend towards 
governance. Thus, as the second section of this paper argued, the European arms regime is the 
outcome of, above all else, the intergovernmental policy competition that took place throughout the 
1990s with regard to arms control. Moreover, while non-state actors can encourage governments to 
champion certain causes, governmental leadership is clearly not dependent on transnational 
advocacy. Thus, neither the adoption of the Luxembourg and Lisbon criteria in 1991/92, nor of the 
Programme on Illicit Trafficking or of the Joint Action on Small Arms were prepared by targeted 
non-state actor activity. In addition, even governments that are generally sympathetic to the aims of 
NGOs calling for stronger arms control put clear limits to the aims they are willing to pursue. Thus, 
although most EU member states by now publish annual reports on arms exports, these reports are 
still providing considerably less detailed information than called for by NGOs. Also, NGOs have 
been arguing repeatedly for the establishment of prior parliamentary scrutiny of arms export licenses. 
Such demands have so far fallen on deaf ears even among those governments closely cooperating 
with non-state actors on other aspects of arms control.55 In short then, although non-state actors have 
played important roles in the creation of the EU regime on arms, governmental interests and 
governmental leadership have remained key to achieving policy change on the level of the EU. It is 
for these reasons that, in my reading, there is not sufficient evidence for claiming a shift towards the 
governance of European arms control.  
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Where then are useful avenues for further research on the role on non-state in the European arms 
regime? Many assumptions made in this paper evidently need a more thorough investigation. Also, it 
would be worth looking at the current funding structures underlying non-state actor activity on small 
arms in more detail, and to assess in how far such activity might be sustainable should private and 
governmental funds for small arms reduce. Thus, given the new salience of terrorism on international 
security agendas, there are already indications that funding for small arms projects is becoming 
harder to secure. If this turns out to be the case, it is just to assume that many NGOs will have to 
limit or end altogether their work on small arms issues. Further, with a view to reassessing the claim 
of governance in the European arms regime, the inclusion of constructivist concerns about the role of 
non-state actors as carriers of ideas that are transforming the nature and scope of international 
debates on security would be worth exploring. It might indeed be in this direction that one can find 
the most substantial evidence for non-state actor influence on the way in which European 
governments address security concerns. Such research might assist in formulating advocacy 
strategies that have greater impact on the political level. Given the devastating human suffering 
caused by the proliferation and misuse of small arms, such research also seems desirable.      
 
